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EXPLORING THE INFORMATION EFFECTS OF IDENTITY AND INFORMATION
TRANSPARENCY IN REPUTATION SYSTEMS
Abstract
Reputation systems are extensively used in e-commerce, particularly online auction markets, to foster
cooperation and accountability between buyers and sellers, resulting in price premiums and improved trust
between buyers and sellers. The diffusion of reputation systems through online auction markets is pervasive, as
trust engendered through reputation is necessary for cooperative action. Information transparency influences
cooperative and competitive behavior in online auction markets, and through information transparency this study
explores the information effects within online auctions on seller reputation and buyer trusting beliefs and
intentions. In addition, a seller's reputation is dependent on the salience of their market identity, and cannot be
relegated to simple feedback scores. Therefore, we propose that perceived reputation of sellers' depends on seller
identifiability through pseudonyms and levels of identity knowledge. Finally, a distinction is drawn between
institutionalized reputation, e.g. feedback scores, and perceived reputation, e.g. the impression of potential buyers.
In this research in progress, we present a theoretically grounded research model to study the effects of identity and
information transparency in reputation systems and online auction markets. We outline the proposed experimental
design using a proxy website to manipulate key information components to induce treatment effects, and conclude
with a discussion of the implications of adopting different identity and transparency design for reputation systems
in online auction markets.

Introduction
Trust-building mechanisms are used extensively in e-commerce and online markets to reduce and resolve
on-line disputes while promoting honest and cooperative business between buyers and sellers (Dellacros 2005;
Resnick 2000, 2002). Reputation systems institutionalize, digitize and aggregate feedback information of buyers
and sellers through feedback scores (Dellacros 2003), while making available information about the quality of
previous transactions through feedback comments. The reputation systems are operationalized differently by
different markets. Some consumer-to-consumer (C2C) online markets such as Amazon (http://www.amazon.com)
have little or no information available about the prior transactions of other buyers and sellers apart from feedback
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ratings. E-Bay (http://www.ebay.com), on the other hand, provides significant information about prior
transactions, including what was purchased, sold, winning bid, winning bidder, feedback comments, etc. The
availability of such information concerning prior transaction may legitimize and subsequently increase a buyer or
seller’s reputation. Research in reputation systems have focused on the relationship between feedback scores and
a variety of outcome variables, particularly price premiums (Ba and Pavlou 2002; Lee et al. 2000) and trust
(Brown and Morgan 2006); however, these studies often ignore the nature of the reputation system mechanisms
and the quality and availability of information about the product and auction. Therefore, this study explores
information effects of several factors (information transparency and identifiability) of the online auction and the
reputation mechanism itself.
Information asymmetry and information transparency as “the degree of visibility and accessibility of
information” (Zhu 2002) influence the behavior of buyers and sellers incentives to cooperate in online markets
(Zhu 2004). Information asymmetries and transparency in online markets differentiate sellers by supporting other
mechanisms in the market, specifically trust and reputation mechanisms (Gregg and Scott 2006). However, no
research has addressed the impact of the nature and amount of information available to buyers and sellers in
online markets on reputation, trust, and buyer's intention to transact.
Reputation systems require some level of identity to function efficiently. Anonymous users have little or
no incentive to behave ethically in the market (Friedman and Resnick 2001), while identified users have no
privacy. Therefore, reputation systems must balance the amount of available information with the privacy of the
user. Pseudonyms are used to promote accountability and cooperation between buyers and sellers, while
maintaining the privacy of users. While the areas of anonymity and identity have been explored in the context of
reputation systems in on-line markets in the past (Friedman and Resnick 2001) none have directly explored the
effects of varying degrees of identifiability on reputation.
The study seeks to expand on previous research that investigates the effects reputation systems have on
consumer reputation and trust in on-line, C2C markets. Researchers have investigated many constructs in markets
with an active reputation system, including trust (Brown and Morgan 2006), price premiums (Ba and Pavlou
2002, Lee et al. 2000), satisfaction, and feedback ratings (Standifird 2001). However, although commonly
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associated with reputation literature, anonymity, identifiability (Friedman and Resnick 2001) and information
transparency (Dellarocas 2003, 2005) are overlooked in reputation systems of online markets. Therefore, the
study seeks to answer the following question: What effect does identifiability, information transparency, and
reputation of buyers and sellers on the formation of trust beliefs and their intentions to transact?

Literature Review
Online markets through e-commerce technologies enable people to engage in on-line transactions with
others in geographically separate areas. On-line markets create several incentives over traditional markets,
including lowering the product price, sales tax, and search costs; however, with higher risk and distribution costs
(Strader and Shaw 1999). Consumers find additional incentives to participate in C2C markets, such as the reduced
or eliminated cost of dealing with an intermediary (Strader and Ramaswami 2002). Many examples of on-line
C2C markets exist. eBay (http://www.ebay.com), for example, is commonly used in on-line C2C market research
as it represents the most successful and ubiquitous case of an online C2C market (Dellarocas 2003; MacInnes, Li,
and Yurick 2005; Strader and Ramaswami 2002). Other examples of C2C markets include Yahoo Auction
(http://auctions.yahoo.com) and new and used items sold on Amazon (http://www.amazon.com) (Resnick 2000).
Many online markets employ reputation systems to build trust and hold participants accountable for their
actions, fostering cooperation between buyers and sellers and improving customer confidence. Reputation
systems, or trust building mechanisms, help buyers and sellers discover information about the satisfaction of past
transactions, without requiring direct word-of-mouth between previous and potential buyers (McDonald and
Slawson 2002). As such, reputation systems provide asynchronous feedback in a structured and organized manner.
Information systems have been used extensively to establish trust and reputation of on-line users trading
consumer goods (Dellarocas 2003; Kollock 1999). By building mechanisms to track the quality of the transaction,
such as buyer and seller satisfaction or feedback, reputation systems are able to foster trustworthiness between
market participants. Reputation is created from repeated interactions between one or more individuals where the
intention of other individuals is uncertain (Wilson 1985). Rein (2005) further conceptualizes reputation as a public
perception of a person, thing, or action and may be either positive or negative (favorable or unfavorable, etc.).
Reputation is a socially constructed phenomenon, in that people’s interactions with the person, thing, or action
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and interactions among themselves create and reinforce a particular perception of the person, thing, or action
(Dellarocas 2003; Rein 2005; Resnick 2000).
Recent literature has found that reputation systems have positive effects on online markets. MacInnes et
al. (2005) found that reputation and experience with on-line transactions on eBay led to a significant decrease in
the number of disputes between buyer and seller. In addition, Gregg and Scott (2006) demonstrated reputation
systems improve the ability of buyers and sellers to detect fraud in eBay auctions through negative feedback
ratings. In addition, reputation systems may exist outside of the marketplace, supporting consumer’s decisions to
purchase from vendors and retailers in the case of Bizrate (http://www.bizrate.com) and particular products
regardless of retailer, such as Epinions (http://www.epinions.com) (Resnick 2000).
This study will differentiate between the two aforementioned notions of reputation. The public, socially
constructed perception of buyers and sellers is termed perceived reputation (e.g. Einwiller 2003; Jarvenpaa et al.
2000; Pennington et al 2004), while the representation of reputation through feedback scores (e.g. Ba and Pavlou
2002) is termed institutional reputation. Literature in reputation systems has focused primarily on how a buyer or
sellers reputation (through feedback scores) affects a variety of outcome variables; however, these studies do not
investigate the relationship between the institutional representation of reputation and how that reputation is
perceived by other buyers and sellers. Institutional reputation is the reputation of the buyer or seller defined by the
institution, in this case, the reputation system of the online market, and is not to be confused with institution-level
constructs, such as institution-based trust, which . In other words, the former is reputation by the institution, while
the latter is trust of or reputation of the institution. Perceived reputation, on the other hand, is the aggregate,
observed interpretation of buyer and seller characteristics, past experiences with the buyer and seller, and of the
institutionalized reputation as codified through feedback scores.

Anonymity and Identifiability
The identity of individuals in traditional markets carries significant weight in terms of reputation when
individual interact often (Klein 1997), and as such, the ability to identify market actors accurately has significant
bearing in the formation of trust from the actor’s reputation. Anonymity and identification create two extremities
of a dichotomous relationship, representing the degree of identity knowledge available to other people (Marx
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1999). Anonymity occurs when a person cannot be appropriately identified by another along several dimension of
identity knowledge. Identification, on the other hand, uses similar dimensions of identity knowledge, although no
ideal state of identification exists. Instead, identification is the degree a person is identifiable along each of the
dimensions of identity knowledge. The seven dimensions of identity knowledge, in order of the ease to identify a
person, are as follows: (1) legal name, (2) location, (3) identifiable pseudonyms, (4) anonymous pseudonyms, (5)
behavioral patterns, (6) social categorization, and (7) symbolic.
Anonymity is an important aspect of online markets, as it protects the identity and other personal
information of buyers and sellers. Anonymity may also be viewed as a mechanism to promote privacy online.
However, anonymity is problematic as participants who enjoy near absolute anonymity have little or no incentive
to cooperate, as buyers and sellers cannot be held personally accountable for their actions. However, while
identifying individuals may greatly improve cooperative market behavior and reduce the occurrence of fraud, as
personal accountability and responsibility can be enforced (Gregg and Scott 2006); privacy concerns may drive
away users, as personal information becomes widely available on the market. Therefore, under both extreme
circumstances, anonymous and identified, severe problems arise in online markets, and the only solution is to
establish some degree of each by using pseudonyms.
Another alternative, online pseudonym, require users to create a temporary, local identity to participate in
the market (Cvrcek 2004; Friedman and Resnick 2001). Pseudonyms preserve the privacy of users, but create a
form of unique identification in the market. On-line C2C markets typically support the creation of pseudonyms,
which carry their own independent reputation apart for the identity of the owner of the pseudonym.
Pseudonymous identities, however, may easily be created and destroyed, providing little benefit for individuals
seeking to be cooperative and fair in the market, but nevertheless provides strong incentives for previous
“cheaters” to become more cooperative with their newfound, pseudonym identity (Friedman and Resnick 2001).
Online markets using systems reputation systems will also decreases the ease of entry and exit since both
significant investments required to develop the reputation, and incentives exist against cheating (Yamamoto et al.
2003).
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Information Transparency
Information transparency is the degree of visibility and accessibility of information (Zhu 2002, 2004).
Information transparency may manifest itself through information asymmetry, the unequal distribution of
information between multiple parties; and may alleviate information asymmetry by increasing the visibility and
accessibility of information for those who have no direct control. Information transparency may also play a role as
an antecedent of reputation and trust in on-line, C2C markets. Zhu (2002, 2004) found in business-to-business
(B2B) on-line markets, the benefits of information transparency to promote cooperation had its limits.
Gregg and Scott (2006) identify two types of information asymmetry in online auctions: product and
seller. Two similar dimensions can be found in information transparency, since information asymmetry is a
product of a deficiency in transparency. In addition, we identify a third dimension related to the auction itself,
such as the terms and conditions of the auction. Therefore, information transparency, within a C2C, auction-based
market context, may be viewed in three dimensions: product, auction, and seller. Information transparency as the
visibility and accessibility of information varies from auction to auction on each of the aforementioned
dimensions. The product dimension of information transparency concerns the presence and availability of
information regarding the nature and condition of the product being sold, including technical specifications,
product description, images, condition, etc. The auction dimension of information transparency concerns the
presence and availability of information regarding the terms of the auction itself, such as purchase or bidding
price, auction terms, warranties and guarantees, etc. The seller dimension refers to the transparency of
information concerning the nature of the seller, including such information as the seller’s past transactions,
feedback on those transactions, and their overall reputation. An interaction effect is plausible between identity and
seller information transparency, where additional information found through the identification of the buyer or
seller contributes to the overall visibility and availability of seller information.

Trust
Trustworthiness is a critical factor in C2C on-line transactions (Dellarocas 2003). The importance of trust
is particularly emphasized in the seller’s reputation and quality of past transactions. Buyers who perceive a seller
with higher trustworthiness or reputation will be more willing to pay a premium for the product or service, which
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may give buyers and sellers the incentive to be trustworthy in order to maintain their reputation (Strader and
Ramaswami 2002; Strader and Shaw 1999).
The study utilizes McKnight et al. (1998) and McKnight and Chervany (2002) construction of the initial
formations of trust to bridge the link between identifiability, information transparency, and reputation, with the
behavioral outcomes, such as buyer satisfaction and feedback. A comprehensive definition of trust, based upon the
theoretical underpinnings of psychological, sociological, and economic thought, is proposed. McKnight defines
trust as follows: “to willingly become vulnerable to the trustee, whether another person, an institution, or people
generally, having taken into consideration the characteristics of the trustee.” (McKnight and Chervany 2002).
McKnight et al. (2002) investigates the framework for the initial formation of trust in an e-commerce,
business-to-consumer (B2C) setting, validating an instrument designed to capture each of the constructs and subconstructs in the originally theorized model. A person’s disposition to trust is the “general propensity to trust
others”, an internal factor influencing the trust of an individual. Institutional-based trust is the willingness to be
vulnerable given structural and environmental factors; therefore, in an on-line auction context, would refer to
security measures, fraud protection, or even perceived reputation.

Research Model
The salient constructs in the study, including a brief definition of the construct and the relevant sources
are outlined in Table 1.The research model (Figure 1) represents the relationships between each of the constructs
listed in Table 1. Our research model incorporates institution-based reputation, representing the feedback scores
of buyers and sellers, and differentiates the effects of institutional reputation on perceived reputation and other
variables.
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Figure 1: Research Model

Institution-based reputation is also expected to have a positive impact on institution-based trust, as
McKnight et al. (2002) suggested that reputation through feedback scores would constitute an institution-based
trust mechanism. Information transparency and identification are both expected to positively influence perceived
reputation. Perceived reputation is, in turn, expected to have a direct, positive impact on the trust beliefs of
buyers. From here, the relationships between disposition to trust, institution-based trust, and trust beliefs are
strongly supported in recent studies (McKnight et al. 1998, 2000); however, the original context involved trust
beliefs and intentions with websites, not online auctions or other buyers or sellers. A buyer's individual disposition
to trust is expected to positively influence both their institution-based trust and trust beliefs. Institution-based
trust, or the willingness to be vulnerable given structural and environmental factors, is expected to positively
affect trust beliefs in the buyer, and ultimately their intention to transact. Transaction intention represents the
trust-related behaviors described in McKnight et al. (2000).

Experimental Design
We plan to use experimental design to test our model. A proxy online auction website and a guided survey
will be utilized in the experimental design. The proxy website will mimic the popular auction website eBay
(http://www.ebay.com) to reduce bias due to unfamiliarity while controlling for market experience. The proxy
website will control each of the informational constructs, including information transparency, identifiability, and
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institutional reputation, and induce each of the treatments according to the informational constructs.
Respondents will be presented a list of products to choose from, including image, title, current price, and
time left in auction. The selection of products is used, in part, to control for product type. The products will be
ordered randomly, but each of the product types will be available on the first selection page. Upon selecting a
product, the treatments for each informational construct will be generated, and the resulting product page will
reflect the various treatments. For example, when a page is selected, the institutional reputation will be randomly
chosen between the categorical variables, namely high and low institutional reputation. The random generation of
institution reputation manifests itself in a reputation score displayed on the product page with the seller
information. Information transparency with respect to the product, as another example, would manifest itself in
the product specification and description disclosed in the auction. The amount of information visible to the buyer
will reflect varying levels of information transparency with respect to the product, the higher levels of information
transparency, the more information available to the buyer through the product specification and description.
Upon reviewing the item selected, respondents complete a questionnaire capturing several outcome
variables respective to the generated auction. The outcome variables include perceived reputation, institutionbased trust, trust intentions, and intention to transact. Disposition to trust is captured with the initial survey, along
with other individual-level constructs, such as web and market experience.
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Constructs

Definition

Source

Independent Variables
Identifiability

The degree of identification of a person through identity
knowledge in the online market.

Marx 1999
Friedman and Resnick 2001

Information Transparency

The degree of visibility and accessibility of information
concerning the seller, product, or auction.

Zhu 2002
Zhu 2004

Institutional Reputation

Digitized and aggregated feedback through a market
mechanism, such as feedback scores.

Resnick 2002

Propensity to trust others without prior knowledge or
institutional support.

McKnight and Chervany 2002
McKnight et al. 2002
McKnight et al. 1998

Socially constructed, public perception of a person,
thing, or action, either favorable or unfavorable.

Rein 2005
Resnick 2002
Jarvenpaa 2000

Institution-Based Trust

Willingness to be vulnerable given structural and
environmental factors.

Idib.

Trust Belief

Initial trust belief other parties will fulfill the terms of
the transaction.

Idib.

Transaction Intention

Intention to engage in the on-line auction transaction.

Liu, et al. 2004

The amount of time a person spends on the Internet.

McKnight and Chervany 2002

Market Experience

The amount of time a person spends on the specific
online market.

MacInnes et al. 2005

Product Price

The monetary price of the product being purchased or
sold.

MacInnes et al. 2005

Product Type

Categorization of the product (as antique, clothes,
electronics, etc.)

MacInnes et al. 2005

Disposition to Trust
Dependent Variables
Perceived Reputation

Control Variables
Web Experience

Table 1: Definition and sources of major constructs

Instrument and Measures
Several measures, having not been operationalized in this context in past research, require validation
before conducting the study. The measures in question include information transparency (to establish a difference
between and high or low levels of each dimension), identifiability (successfully mapping the categorized degrees
of identity knowledge to each of the three stages), and the discrepancy between institutionalized reputation and
perceived reputation.
Information transparency is operationalized through the three dimensions identified in the previous
section: (1) product, (2) auction, and (3) seller. Each dimension is dichotomously separated measuring high and
low levels of information transparency, resulting in a three by two matrix for information transparency. Product
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information transparency is manipulated through the availability of additional product information, or the absence
of important information. For example, the specifications for a computer may be left from the auction description,
having only a make and year purchased. Auction information transparency is manipulated through the absence of
information regarding shipping or warranties. Finally, seller information transparency is manipulated through the
absence of available information regarding the seller, such as geographical location, contact information, etc.
To operationalize identifiability, this study uses the seven degrees of identity knowledge outlined in Marx
(1999). Three categories, or states, of identifiability are operationalized using these seven degrees of identity
knowledge, and the categories are anonymous, pseudonymous, and identified. Identified individuals may be
known through the their (1) legal name, (2) location, and (3) identifiable pseudonyms. Therefore, for online
markets, the identified state will be operationalized through either the disclosure of legal names or identifiable
pseudonyms. Location is often disclosed after the transaction to complete the shipping process. Finally, the
anonymous state is only applied to the final three states of identity knowledge, knowing (1) behavioral patterns,
(2) social organizations, and (3) symbolic behaviors.

Discussion and Contribution
This research seeks to contribute to theory in several ways. First, we investigate several constructs largely
ignored by research in reputation systems, namely identifiability and information transparency. Although
identifiability has been explored in an e-commerce context using C2C markets, such research primarily
established a link between the creation of and ease of creating pseudonyms and establishing a new reputation in
the market (Cvcrek and Matyas 2004; Friedman and Resnick 2001). Our study expands on identifiability and
pseudonimity research in reputation systems by exploring market-based outcomes, such as purchasing intention.
Our second contribution concerns the decision-making processes of consumers in online auction markets,
involving the formation of trust through reputation, identifiability, and information transparency. Much research in
the area of online auction markets uses data from past transactions to support relationships between
institutionalized reputation and outcome variables (e.g. Brown and Morgan 2006; Gregg and Scott 2006;
MacInnes et al 2005). Our research explores perceptual measures of reputation and trust through the decisionmaking and trust formation processes towards intentions to transact with the seller. While using theory of
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reasoned action based models in assessing transaction intention with web vendors has been used widely (e.g.
Gefen and Straub 2003; Jarvenpaa et al 2002; McKnight and Chervany 2002), its presence in reputation systems
and online auction markets is not as prevalent. Finally, our research hopes to differentiate between previously
synonymous views of reputation, namely institutional and perceived reputation. While we suspect the correlation
between these two perceptions to be significant, the nature of each of these perspectives on reputation is markedly
different.
Two stakeholders may benefit from the insights of this research: sellers and auctioneers. Sellers bear the
burden of maintaining an attractive reputation; but nevertheless benefit from having a positive reputation through
price premiums, for example (e.g. Ba and Pavlou 2002). Understanding how additional information about the
individual as a seller (identifiability) or controlling the amount of information about previous or present
transactions (information transparency) may help improve the seller’s reputation, and the ease that buyers trust the
seller. Improving one’s reputation and increasing trust with other parties not only brings a price premium on the
product, but also may increase the likelihood, the willingness of buyers to purchase, or bid on the product.
Auctioneers, the individuals or businesses who operate the online auction market, also have significant gains to be
realized from the prosperity of the seller. For one, by increasing the number of transactions and the success of
those transactions, auction websites are more able to maintain and attract new buyers and sellers to the market.
Both by increasing the number of transactions and the number of individuals participating in the market, the
auctioneers are able to expand their revenue through fees, either from posting a product on the market, or a
percentage of the winning bid on the product. Thusly, any additional insight into the type of reputation
mechanisms that is more beneficial to improving this “bottom line” would be a boon to the auctioneer. Through
studying the amount of information and visibility of buyer and sellers on the market, auctioneers may be able to
construct a reputation mechanism that communicates trust and reputation, the number of successful transactions
and overall satisfied customers.
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